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Mind Wars.

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make any such attack extremely costly. No one can expect to occupy Switzerland like the Nazis in 1938-39 in Czechoslovakia, or the Soviets in the same country thirty years later. This book explains quite well why not.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Naval War College

Wyden, Peter. *The Passionate War: The Narrative History of the Spanish Civil War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 574pp. \$19.95

Peter Wyden, a former correspondent for *Newsweek* and magazine editor, has written an anecdotal history of the Spanish Civil War. He provides detailed profiles of both Rebel and Republican leaders as well as some of the rank and file. He supplies reams of data on members of the International Brigades, and devotes much space to the careers and activities of reporters who covered the conflict. A reader interested in knowing what Ernest Hemingway, George Orwell or James Lardner among others did during the war will find it all in Wyden's book. Finally, the author makes it very clear just how vicious and brutal the war was and offers vivid descriptions of atrocities committed by both sides.

What is absent from *The Passionate War* is any sustained description or analysis of strategy or tactics. There are no orders of battle or discussions of major battles. The role of naval power is not even mentioned. Furthermore, aside from a few generalizations there is no analysis of the war's role in European diplomacy,

and the author makes no effort to discuss the impact of the conflict on European and American public opinion.

Despite these shortcomings Wyden's book is still interesting and useful. It is well written and gives a good flavor of the times. A reader familiar with the work of Hugh Thomas, Gabriel Jackson and Stanley Payne will find Wyden's book an exciting and useful supplement.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

McRae, Ronald. *Mind Wars*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 183pp. \$12.95

This interesting book's subtitle describes its contents, to wit, "the true story of government research into the military potential of psychic weapons." However, for those who know something about military applications of "psi" (extra sensory perceptions, of several kinds) this book may prove something of a disappointment because it does not penetrate the subject. This is surprising in a book introduced by Jack Anderson and written by one of his former "associates."

Ronald McRae describes himself as having served five years in the US Navy, and describes the US Navy as one of two leading US Government sponsors and consumers of psychic warfare research during the heyday of military psi research, i.e., from 1972 through 1982, mostly from 1973 to 1978.

Sifting through this book, readers

can see that the other principal government sponsor of military psi research was the CIA; not a surprise. Inasmuch as the Navy Department and the CIA rarely agree on anything, even with an admiral as CIA director, what is surprising is to find these two entities interested, at the same time and often in the same place, in something so imprecise and poorly understood as military parapsychology. Perhaps this is explained by the similar interests of these two organizations. The Navy investigated the use of psi for antisubmarine warfare and, to a lesser extent, antiair warfare. CIA pursued the use of psi for remote viewing, i.e., seeing otherwise denied or inaccessible "secrets" from afar, e.g., looking inside a Soviet command post from locations near Washington DC, a very useful espionage method if it works. McRae believes explicitly that it does not work, but offers no proof, perhaps because he offers no methodological insight into how it is supposed to work.

Navy interest in military psi seems more ominous and, in a sense, more disparate, viz., can enemy submarines be identified and located at sea by extrasensory perception and can CV aviators' flight performance be altered adversely by enemy psychic influences? Now, indeed, this is worth a lot to know. But, if the contract prices which McRae cites the Navy having spent on psychic research during the 10-year period 1972-82 are anywhere nearly complete, then the Navy Department has not been at all serious. At most, *Mind*

Wars accounts for \$100,000, a pittance even to establish an epistemology for such an inexact science as psychic warfare remains today.

McRae also examines US Army interest in psychic warfare, though the direction and outcomes suggest something pretty far afield from the empiricism of ground warfare now or in the future. An Army authority believes that "Legionnaires' Disease" is caused by Soviet psychotronic (electronically enhanced psi) experiments. Submariners know that phosgene escaping from leaky air conditioners in closed spaces causes a malady remarkably similar to Legionnaires' Disease. The US Air Force is said by McRae to have funded psychic warfare research, too, though little else is revealed about Air Force interest, perhaps because the Air Force has a particular "far-out" cross to bear in the form of its UFO associations over several years.

Soviet research into psychic warfare is also treated in *Mind Wars*, mainly from the standpoint of CIA, DIA, and NSA analyses of and reporting on that intriguing subject. One is not surprised to learn that DIA assessed the USSR as leading the USA in military parapsychology. The Navy seems also interested in what the Russians are up to, though McRae is easily put off by Navy secrecy and issue-avoidance concerning both US and USSR state-of-the-art in psychic warfare. A more comprehensive treatment of the USSR's research in psychic warfare can be found in Martin Ebon's *Psychic Warfare: Threat or Illusion* (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1983), which McRae cites.

This reviewer obtained a copy of *Mind Wars* from the Army's Center of Military History in Washington, DC and read it primarily for its discovery and surprise values. There were two: The first suggests a specific US military application of the psi factor to winning battles through electronics and maneuver rather than solely by attrition; the second suggests the true extent and scope of US DoD/intelligence community interest in psychic warfare, general interest inclusive and corroborative of the specifics, a consistency not made clear in *Mind Wars*.

JAMES T. WESTWOOD
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Hartigan, Richard Shelly. *Lieber's Code and the Law of War*. Chicago: Precedent, 1983. 157pp. \$17.95

This small volume opens with an introduction which offers a somewhat sketchy biography of Francis Lieber: as a teenage member of Blucher's army in Belgium, seriously wounded at Namur; his studies in Germany and his political difficulties with the police; his attempt to aid the Greeks in their struggle for independence; his emigration to London and then to Boston; his almost quarter of a century as a Professor at South Carolina College (now the University of South Carolina); and his ultimate success in securing the long-sought-after position at Columbia College in New York. It then continues with its real subject matter, a discussion of some of his works and of

his wartime correspondence with General Henry W. Halleck, while the latter was the "General in Chief" of the Union forces.

Just 122 years ago, on 24 April 1863, Lieber's code of land warfare, the first of its kind, was published by the Federal Government as General Orders No. 100, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*. As the author of the most important biography of Lieber (quoted by the author of the book under review) has correctly stated, "it was an admixture of military sternness with basic humanitarianism." It thereafter served as a source for the draftsmen of the unratified 1874 Declaration of Brussels and of the ratified 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations. It also served to some extent as a source for the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Prisoners-of-War Conventions. Professor Hartigan has included this historic document in an appendix, making it much more easily available to the general public and to the researcher.

Although not as well known, Lieber's earlier monograph, entitled *Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War*, is also worthy of the continued interest which it has received, particularly in this era of guerrillas, partisans, national liberation armies, and just plain terrorists—all of whom claim to be legal combatants and to be entitled to prisoner-of-war treatment when they are captured, no matter for whom they fight, what their cause may be, and how they conduct the conflict in which they